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The Arab–Khazar wars were a series of conflicts fought between the armies of the Khazar Khaganate and the Umayyad Caliphate (as well as its Abbasid successor) and their respective vassals. Historians usually distinguish two major periods of conflict, the First (сa. 642–652) and Second (ca. 722–737) Arab–Khazar Wars,〔Brook (2006), pp. 126–127〕 but the Arab–Khazar military confrontation involved several sporadic raids and isolated clashes as well, over a period from the middle of the 7th century to the end of the 8th century. The Arab–Khazar wars were a result of the attempts of the Umayyad Caliphate to secure control of Transcaucasia and the North Caucasus, where the Khazars were already established. The first Arab invasion, in the 640s and early 650s, ended with the defeat of an Arab force led by Abd ar-Rahman ibn Rabiah outside the Khazar town of Balanjar. Hostilities broke out again with the Caliphate in the 710s, with raids back and forth across the Caucasus. Led by the distinguished generals al-Jarrah ibn Abdallah and Maslama ibn Abd al-Malik, the Arabs were able to capture Derbent and even the southern Khazar capital of Balanjar, but this had little impact on the nomadic Khazars, who remained able to launch devastating raids deep into Transcaucasia. In one such raid in 730, the Khazars inflicted a major defeat on the Umayyad forces at the Battle of Ardabil, killing al-Jarrah, but were in turn defeated the next year and pushed back north. Maslama then recovered Derbent, which became a major Arab military outpost and colony, before being replaced by Marwan ibn Muhammad (the future caliph Marwan II) in 732. A period of relatively localized warfare followed until 737, when Marwan led north a massive expedition that reached the Khazar capital Atil on the Volga. After securing some form of submission by the ''khagan'', the Arabs withdrew. The 737 campaign marked the end of large-scale warfare between the two powers, establishing Derbent as the northernmost Muslim outpost and securing Muslim dominance over Transcaucasia. At the same time, the long wars weakened the Umayyad army and contributed to the eventual fall of the dynasty a few years later. Relations between the Muslims of the Caucasus and the Khazars remained largely peaceful thereafter, apart from two Khazar raids in the 760s and in 799, each resulting from failed efforts to secure a marriage alliance between the Arab governors of the Caucasus and the Khazar ''khagan''. Occasional warfare continued in the region between the Khazars and the local Muslim principalities of the Caucasus until the collapse of the Khazar state in the late 10th century, but the great wars of the 8th century were never repeated. ==Background and strategic motives== The Arab–Khazar wars were part of a long series of military conflicts between the nomadic peoples of the Pontic-Caspian steppe and the more settled regions south of the Caucasus range, dating back to Antiquity. The two great passes over the Caucasus, the Darial Pass ("Alan Gates") in the centre and the Pass of Derbent ("Caspian Gates") had been used as invasion routes since Classical times, and their defence against the northern barbarian hordes came to be regarded as one of the chief duties of imperial regimes to the south. Thus the shahs of the Sassanid Empire, from Peroz I (r. 457–484) to Khosrau I (r. 531–579), built a long line of fortifications from the Caucasus to the Caspian Sea.〔Blankinship (1994), p. 106〕〔Mako (2010), pp. 51–52〕 Derbent itself, which would feature prominently in the Arab–Khazar conflict, was built by the Persians in the early 6th century as a strategic choke-point and gateway (its name in Persian, ''Dar-band'', means "Knot of the Gates") between the north and south.〔Brook (2006), p. 126〕 This is reflected in the popular belief among Middle Eastern cultures that Alexander the Great had with divine assistance barred the Caucasus against the hordes of "Gog and Magog", an echo of invasions by the Scythians and the Huns.〔Mako (2010), pp. 50–51〕 Eventually, the Khazars would take their place, and early medieval writers came to identify the Khazars with Gog and Magog.〔Brook (2006), pp. 7–8〕 Since the nascent Caliphate regarded itself as the heir of the Sassanid (and to a lesser extent, Byzantine) tradition and "civilizational consciousness", the Arab caliphs also adopted the notion that it was their duty "to protect the settled, i.e. the civilized world from the northern barbarian" (G. Mako). To this imperative was added the Muslim concept of division of the world into the "House of Islam" (''Dar al-Islam'') and the "House of War" (''Dar al-Harb''), to which the pagan Turkic nomads were consigned.〔Mako (2010), pp. 52–53〕 Consequently the eastern Caucasus range also became the main theatre of the Arab–Khazar conflict, with the Arab armies aiming to gain control of Derbent (known in Arabic as Bab al-Abwab, "Gate of Gates") and the Khazar cities of Balanjar and Samandar, whose location has yet to be established with certainty. Both of the latter are referred to as Khazar capitals by different Arab writers, and may have functioned as winter and summer capitals respectively. It was only later, under the impact of the Arab attacks, that the Khazars moved their capital further north, to Atil on the mouths of the Volga.〔Barthold & Golden (1997), p. 1173〕 To an extent, the Arab–Khazar wars were also linked to the struggle of the Caliphate against the Byzantine Empire along the eastern fringes of Asia Minor, a theatre of war which adjoined the Caucasus. The Byzantine emperors pursued close relations with the Khazars, which amounted to a virtual alliance for most of the period in question, including such exceptional acts as the marriage of emperor Justinian II to a Khazar princess in 705.〔Blankinship (1994), pp. 108–109〕〔Lilie (1976), p. 157〕 The possibility of the Khazars linking up with the Byzantines through Armenia was a grave threat to the Caliphate, especially given its proximity to the Umayyad metropolitan province of Syria.〔 This did not materialize, and Armenia was left largely quiet, with the Umayyads granting it wide-ranging autonomy and the Byzantines likewise refraining from active campaigning there.〔Blankinship (1994), p. 107〕 Although some Byzantinists, notably Dimitri Obolensky, suggested that the Arab–Khazar wars were motivated by a Muslim desire to outflank the Byzantine defences from the north, this idea is not borne out by the limited nature of the conflict before until the 720s.〔Mako (2010), pp. 49–50〕 It is more probable that the Byzantines encouraged the Khazars to attack the Caliphate to relieve the mounting pressure on their own eastern frontier in the early 8th century,〔Blankinship (1994), p. 109〕 as indeed they profited considerably from the diversion of the Muslim armies northwards in the 720s and 730s, resulting in another marriage alliance, between the future emperor Constantine V (r. 741–775) and the Khazar princess Tzitzak in 733.〔Blankinship (1994), pp. 149–154〕〔Lilie (1976), pp. 157–160〕 The issue of control over the northern branch of the Silk Road by the Caliphate has been suggested as a further motive for the conflict, but G. Mako disputes this claim by pointing out that warfare declined at precisely the period of the greatest expansion of traffic along the Silk Road, i.e. after the middle of the 8th century.〔Mako (2010), pp. 48–49〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Arab–Khazar wars」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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